

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Agenda]
SPKR[Hohenfellner] MS[Austria] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Adoption of the agenda]
TXT[Adoption of the agenda
Information concerning the situation in Iraq (S/22799)
The agenda was adopted.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Hohenfellner] MS[Austria] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[S/22799]
TXT[Drew attention to document S/22799 containing a letter dated 15 July 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the report on humanitarian needs in Iraq prepared by the inter-agency mission headed by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq/Turkey and Iraq/Iran border areas. The report gave a clear picture of the circumstances under which the Iraqi population was living and contained recommendations to improve their situation.]

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CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Agha Khan] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]
ITEM[S/22799]
TXT[Introducing the report of the inter-agency mission to assess humanitarian needs in Iraq, said that the decision to conduct a high-level mission had been taken at a meeting of executive heads of United Nations specialized agencies and programmes responsible for humanitarian activities in the region, held in Geneva on 13 June under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. The mandate of the mission had been "to conduct an updated and more precise assessment of the current humanitarian needs and recommend measures to address them". Although the mandate did not include the issue of sanctions, he was pleased to have an opportunity to present the findings and conclusions of the mission to Committee members. The United Nations experts designated as "team leaders" for the four key sectors of the mission - water and sanitation, health, food supply and energy - were present and would respond to questions by Committee members. The mission had been "field-based" and team members had visited every corner of Iraq.]

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SPKR[Agha Khan] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]
ITEM[S/22799]
TXT[In conducting its evaluation, the mission had not allowed itself to be influenced exclusively by reports received from the Iraqi capital. The food-sector team had conducted market surveys in 16 of the 18 governorates of Iraq, covering most provincial capitals and accounting for approximately 95 per cent of the national food crop production. The water and sanitation team had made extensive visits to the Governorates of Kut, Amarah, Basra, Arbil and Dohuk, where it had reviewed the situation with local authorities, plant operators and the local population. They had inspected treatment plants and met in Baghdad with representatives of the Ministry of Health and the water authorities. The health

team had visited paediatric wards and health centres in five governorates in the south and six in the north. They had held extensive discussions with medical, surgical and nursing staff. The energy team had made assessments over an area ranging from Basra in the south to Mosul in the north,]

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TXT[visiting 15 power-generating plants and many transmission substations. Mission members had met with Iraqi officials at all levels and had reviewed the current conditions with the local population in all regions. They had met with the Minister of Defence, the Ministers responsible for the four mission teams and their respective technical aides. The discussions had culminated in a high-level interministerial meeting, chaired by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and attended by all the relevant Ministers, including the Minister of Health, the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Food and the Minister of Oil. Various members of the mission had also engaged in extensive talks with the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz. The report contained the outcome of those activities. He wished to draw the Committee's attention to the following basic facts: there was a clear, undeniable humanitarian need in Iraq;]

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ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[it would be absurd and indefensible for the United Nations to assure financial responsibility for Iraq's needs at a time when it could barely respond to numerous other urgent crises and disasters, from Bangladesh to the Horn of Africa; Iraq had considerable oil reserves and could assume the cost of its own humanitarian needs; if the Committee were to decide that Iraq should be allowed to use funds from oil sales, or if it were to facilitate the use of blocked accounts to meet "essential civilian needs", a suitable control mechanism and a monitoring system would have to be identified and established. To view the issue in terms of lifting - or maintaining - sanctions would be an oversimplification. The aim of the mission had been to ensure that the sanctions imposed had not had an adverse effect from the humanitarian viewpoint. That concern had been voiced repeatedly by President Bush of the United States, who had stressed that no harm should come to civilian and vulnerable groups.]

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TXT[The crucial question was whether funding could be ensured and emergency assistance allowed under the sanctions regime. Until funding was guaranteed, a vast United Nations presence and inter-agency humanitarian operation would have to be maintained in Iraq. The cost would be borne essentially by the taxpayers of the countries that were major donors to the United Nations - in other words, the Western democracies. A mechanism for control and

transparency in funding was essential, though the details had not been addressed in the mission's report. The mission to assess humanitarian needs had coincided with other ongoing missions to Iraq, although its visits had not been related to the particular concerns of those missions. The mission had not sought to make determinations that were within the purview of the Security Council and, more particularly, the Committee. He did not wish to propose more precise formulas concerning such matters as the possible sale of oil, the unfreezing of blocked assets,]

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TXT[a purchasing system under which commodities would be imported, the procurement process, monitoring and control or monitoring within Iraq. On the latter point, representatives of the United Nations specialized agencies and programmes could provide valuable input on what their organizations might achieve in such areas as nutritional surveillance, public health assessment, or checks of market prices. In that sense, a significant United Nations presence in Iraq might make a contribution. However, he believed that it had not been the Secretary-General's intention to create an Office of the Executive Delegate on a permanent basis. The role of the Executive Delegate and the mission was to serve as "troubleshooters" and as catalysts, not to build institutions. Vigilance remained the watchword of the mission. The situation in the north and south of Iraq was still critical. Recent events concerning the Kurdish population in the north had threatened to undermine the necessary climate of confidence.]

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TXT[In order to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to displaced people in the southern marshland areas, where the need was particularly urgent, he had travelled with mission members on 11 July to Nasiriya and to villages along the edge of the marshes in that region. Arrangements had been made for a United Nations convoy carrying supplies from the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to meet the mission in the village of Hammar. It had been established that the difficult situation of displaced persons there could be eased by United Nations humanitarian assistance. With the apparent suspension of military activities, a number of displaced persons had seized the opportunity to return to their homes. Subsequently, reliable reports of a renewed and stepped-up military presence in the area had been received.]

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TXT[However, the mission had not yet received the authorization urgently needed in order to establish a United Nations humanitarian centre with a complement of United Nations guards that would ensure

access to the displaced population in the marshes. He would not relax his efforts to obtain the necessary clearance from Baghdad. It seemed that the mission's request fell within the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding that he had signed in Baghdad on 18 April. The mission could help not only to alleviate suffering but also to stabilize a volatile situation and ensure that there was no discrimination between north and south in the distribution of aid. The special role of the United Nations guards must be highlighted. They had assumed numerous duties, as agreed with the Iraqi Government, including the protection of United Nations personnel and premises. It was hoped that additional contributions by Member States would bring their numbers to 500 in a very short time.]

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TXT[The guards had also acted as escorts for convoys carrying food, medicines and general relief supplies, and for repatriation convoys, particularly of Kurds returning to the north. They had patrolled the towns, the routes of returnees and, generally, all areas where United Nations humanitarian assistance operations were in progress. Numerous reports had been received describing the exemplary conduct of the guards under the most trying conditions. The innovative manner in which they had been deployed had facilitated the conduct of humanitarian operations in the north and allowed for an orderly withdrawal on 15 July.]

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TXT[The guards had also provided advance information on the situation and the number of casualties in Sulaymaniyah, acted as moral witnesses and served to restore a climate of confidence in the area. In conclusion, the mission was not facing an easy situation. As a result of distrust - however justifiable - on the part of the international community, the Iraqi civilian population, particularly the vulnerable groups, would doubtless be the first to suffer.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Pickering] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[Expressed his delegation's serious concern with respect to the humanitarian needs of the innocent civilians in Iraq, especially the vulnerable minority groups mentioned in the report, which did not seem to be receiving an equitable portion of the food distributed. His delegation agreed that the short-term needs of the Iraqi people far exceeded the capacity of the United Nations and the world charitable community to assist them. Consideration should be given to the fact that Iraq was able to fund its own needs and was meanwhile drawing resources away from other emergency areas. His delegation welcomed the report's emphasis on the urgency of preventing starvation and death in the immediate future. His delegation had questions concerning the scope of the report, particularly with regard to the assignment of priorities. It also

had questions concerning developments in Iraq under the current regime, which were not immediately clarified in the report.]

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SPKR[Pickering] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

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TXT[His delegation also had questions with respect to monitoring and supervision, which, it believed, should be discussed further by the Committee, perhaps in relation to the duties of the Executive Delegate. In that connection, his delegation greatly appreciated the letter addressed by the Executive Delegate to the Iraqi Government, describing the difficult situation in the marsh areas and the mission's commitment to remain there. Health and the short-term provision of food should continue to be the main focus. In that connection, his delegation would appreciate clarification concerning repairs and refurbishment in the oil sector and the closely allied telecommunications sector. Rebuilding in those sectors must be narrowly focused on the provision of services such as clean water and sewage treatment, in the light of reports that Iraq could be diverting 800 to 900 megawatts of the 9,500 megawatts of power it produced to clandestine uranium-enrichment programmes.]

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SPKR[Pickering] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

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TXT[Moreover, great quantities of power might be absorbed by other aspects of the Iraqi military industry, including chemical and biological weapons. The Committee must consider whether restoration of the power sector would result in the development and expansion of the country's large pre-war military establishment. In that light, his delegation agreed that the target of restoring 25 to 40 per cent of the oil sector would be reasonable. The current production capacity mentioned in the report might be considered together with the pipeline export capacity that could be made available if the Committee and the Security Council so decided. The restoration of the oil industry should therefore be subject to further developments, which would be carefully examined by the Committee.]

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SPKR[Pickering] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

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TXT[The cost of providing sufficient food, health care and clean water should be a primary concern of the mission. He wondered whether the mission had learned of commercial commitments entered into by Iraq in order to alleviate the suffering of its population.]

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SPKR[Pickering] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

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TXT[The report did not seem to contain any reference to the shipment of the 2 million tons of food of which the Committee

itself had been notified. His delegation also wondered whether the current harvest in the north-east had been factored into the mission's survey of the food situation. It would be useful to know whether the mission had attempted to take into account the actual availability of food, and whether it had determined that regular harvests would ensure adequate food supplies in the north. His delegation also wished to know if food was being stored. If so, it would appreciate details on quantity and locations. Information on the short-term availability of food would be particularly useful. His delegation had received reports of food convoys entering Iraq from Jordan and wondered whether they were meeting a significant proportion of the food needs in Iraq. Lastly, his delegation, too, was concerned by the question of monitoring and control.]

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SPKR[Pickering] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

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TXT[It would appreciate details on how funds would be collected and administered and how they would be allocated for priority needs. A certain amount of "downstream monitoring" was necessary in order to ensure that humanitarian needs were being met adequately. There must be guarantees that funds were not diverted for political or military purposes under the current regime, but were used to implement Security Council resolution 687 (1991), particularly paragraph 23, and other resolutions dealing with humanitarian assistance.]

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SPKR[Brun] MS[UNICEF] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[The food-supply and health teams, using a whole range of early-warning indicators, had determined that the current acute food shortage could result in widespread starvation if immediate action was not taken. Acting on an Iraqi Government request, farmers had increased their grain production to the exclusion of other crops. Indeed, grain acreage had increased by 50 per cent. However, owing to a shortage of inputs and the destruction of pumps and other irrigation equipment, only 1.2 million tons of grain had been harvested. In normal times, consumption was 7.5 million tons. Iraq, with a population of 18 million, required at least one half kilogram of grain or 1,600 calories per person, equivalent to 9,000 tons per month. That was the quantity which had been delivered by the international community thus far and the World Food Programme had provided an additional 11,000 tons. Australia had agreed to provide 100,000 tons of grain, which was sufficient for 10 days' consumption,]

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SPKR[Brun] MS[UNICEF] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

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TXT[and another agreement reportedly reached would make another 900,000 tons available. The 1.2 million tons produced by Iraq, plus the 2 million tons in international assistance would still amount to less than half the country's normal annual consumption. The Iraqi dinar, which before the war had been worth about \$3, had

fallen in value to about \$0.14. As a result, grain could be exported to Turkey or Iran and sold there for a better price than in Iraq, and the same was true of cattle and sheep; that did not improve the situation in Iraq. The team assigned to inspect food distribution had been able to carry out inspections without notice and had almost always found the distribution equitable. Some returnees had, however, had problems because their names were not on the list. The system was providing only one third to one half of pre-war consumption, or between 1,300 and 1,600 kilocalories per day. For the moment people had adapted to the short commons, but the situation was dangerous and could become critical any day.]

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SPKR[Brun] MS[UNICEF] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

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TXT[With regard to convoys from Jordan, if food had been brought in privately, it must certainly have been at exorbitant prices. Iraqis were entitled to 8 kilograms of wheat flour monthly at the subsidized price, but anything more had to be bought on the free market at 45 to 48 times the pre-war price. Similarly, any rice over and above the monthly ration of 1.5 kilograms was 22 times the pre-war price. Iraqis were restricted to three 400-gram cans of milk each month, which was 10 days' supply at the most, after which they had to pay from 35 to 100 times the pre-war price for additional cans. As a result, infants were being fed on bread and tea and starvation was resulting among children up to 5 years of age. Certainly, the Committee could never monitor the whole of Iraq's economy. However, thanks to the presence of UNICEF in Iraq, an efficient system could be established for monitoring the health of such children and reporting to the Committee. No better network was available than the existing UNICEF facilities.]

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SPKR[Moore] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[Speaking as an expert participant in the mission, said that the power system in Iraq showed damage such as he had never seen in his 40 years of experience. If the installed capacity had been 9,500 megawatts, as was reported, it would cost \$20 billion to replace that capacity. To restore the existing installations to their former effectiveness might cost \$12 billion. A further \$5 million per year would have to be budgeted for spare parts, lubricants, replacement gear, etc. for the upkeep of power stations. However, in Iraq, no spare parts were available since stockpiles had been destroyed in the war. Management, staff and engineers had done wonders in restoring about 25 per cent of the original generating capacity - as of 1 July, about 2,300 megawatts were on line - but the system was in a very chancy condition. The loss of one minor component could, for instance, cause the complete shut-down of a 100-megawatt plant. Furthermore, reservoirs had as a precaution been drawn down before the start of the war,]

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TXT[with the result that water was unavailable not just for irrigation but also for power generation. One 750-megawatt plant was running at 100 megawatts only, and output was expected to drop by a further 5 megawatts with each week that passed. The power supply would continue to fall, and disastrous results could be predicted for the people of Iraq. For instance, the sewage system of Baghdad, which lay in an extensive plain, relied heavily on electrical pumping stations. Often, however, the replacement of a simple component would restore a large generating plant to service. With regard to the contention by the United States delegation that power was being diverted to nuclear facilities, he had been informed by officials that 23 per cent of all electrical power generated had gone to industry in 1990; the comparable figure for 1991 was just 4 per cent. Any power going to nuclear facilities would have to be part of that amount. More than half of the power generated was going to residences.]

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SPKR[Moore] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

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TXT[It would cost \$6 billion to restore the oil sector to health, and at least \$500 million to maintain it at a reasonable level. Its recovery was being impeded by the shortage of petroleum additives used to increase the octane level of gasoline.]

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SPKR[Moberly] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[Speaking as an expert participant in the mission, said, with regard to control and monitoring within Iraq, that the members of the mission were not experts in the procurement of foodstuffs and the monitoring of such procurement or in seeing that food and medicines were equitably distributed. However, they had been told by the Iraqis that all documents relating to outside purchases of grain were open to review by the Committee; moreover, the financial transactions could easily be monitored, as most involved developed countries such as the United States. In any case, all agreed that, whatever arrangements were made, there was an urgent need for an adequate system to ensure that any funds released were spent as intended. The process could be made transparent with respect to foreign orders and financing; within Iraq, that was more difficult. If a contract was left to a United States supplier and grain was shipped, United Nations agencies should be able, in the course of their normal assessment of health conditions in the country,]

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SPKR[Moberly] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

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TXT[to determine whether rations had increased correspondingly. Unequal distribution resulted from inequalities of power and wealth, not from a faulty distribution system. It followed that distribution would be improved if prices were reduced. The team had been unable to obtain information on the amount of resources absorbed by the military. Conversely, they had seen no indication that the Iraqis were applying military resources to civilian

problems; all felt the Iraqis should do so. It was hard to tell how much of any purchase was being used for military purposes. More discussion was needed in the Committee on an efficient monitoring system. It was unrealistic to expect the United Nations to distribute food or medicines in Iraq; the undertaking was simply too vast. However, the United Nations should remain present in the country whatever arrangements were made, as should the United Nations guards, who could give early warning of deteriorating conditions in Iraq.]

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SPKR[Moberly] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

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TXT[During their cooperation with technical groups early in the mission, team members had seen no indication that they were being manipulated. Governors had not dictated an itinerary, but had allowed team members to visit hospitals, distribution centres and so on. The mission had been sufficiently free to make a true assessment of the situation.]

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SPKR[Pickering] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

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TXT[Given the past performance of the Iraqi Government it was not possible to trust its utterances on food distribution and the like. The unaided efforts of the United Nations were certainly not enough to manage a crisis in Iraq. Transparency, spot checks and the continued presence of the United Nations were very much in keeping with the appropriate current attitude towards Iraq.]

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SPKR[Hannay] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[Welcomed the humanitarian role of the United Nations in Iraq and the system of United Nations guards. The United Kingdom was doing what it could to help the Executive Delegate in his efforts, which were not always encouraged by the Iraqis: all Shias, for instance, were said to have been removed from one area before the Executive Delegate's visit, and subsequently returned. The issue of resumption of Iraqi oil exports raised other questions, such as Iraq's obligation to finance the destruction of its weapons of mass destruction. The United Kingdom shared the view of the representative of the United States that there were differing priorities and degrees of emergency in the situations described in the mission's report. The United Kingdom believed that there was imminent danger of a real disaster, but the response should be a genuine response to an emergency and not simply a rebuilding of the pre-war Iraqi economy.]

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SPKR[Hannay] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

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TXT[The restoration of Iraq's oil economy, for instance, would be tantamount to putting the country back on a war footing, since the

recent history of Iraq had been one of oil-financed aggression. Electrical power supplies, too, had been largely used for military purposes. There was little reason to suppose that the intentions of the Iraqi Government in that regard had changed. Like money, oil and electrical power were commodities that could be used for either peaceful or warlike purposes; telecommunications facilities fell into the same category. On the issue of control functions, the United Kingdom welcomed the scepticism expressed by the representative of the United States with respect to the statements of the Iraqi Government, whose past performance had not been good. With regard to the control of oil exports and the financial proceeds from such exports, he wondered how one might ensure that the proceeds would be used for the humanitarian purposes for which the sale had been authorized.]

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SPKR[Hannay] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
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TXT[A system should be instituted to see that 100 per cent of the funds earmarked for humanitarian projects actually was spent on them. The apportionment of such monies was also a question, since there were many contending priorities in Iraq. Moreover, although a United Nations monopoly on distribution was not possible, every effort should be made to ensure that there was no discrimination by the Iraqis between elements of their own population for political reasons.]

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SPKR[Agha Khan] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]
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TXT[Was mindful of resolution 688 (1991) and the responsibility of the United Nations in that regard. However, the United Nations was in an awkward position. If it was to monitor compliance with Committee decisions on the use of Iraqi assets or the proceeds from oil sales, its role must and could be strengthened by full implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding of 18 April. The Memorandum of Understanding expired at the end of the current year and must then be reviewed with the concurrence of the Iraqi authorities, which persisted in their non-acceptance of resolution 688 (1991). With respect to the remarks by the representative of the United Kingdom on power and communications, the mission had been careful to distinguish the emergency phase from the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase, and in fact the recommendations in the report dealt only with a four-month period, certainly not long enough for rehabilitation of the economy.]

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TXT[Indeed, the Secretary-General had appealed on 15 June for \$450 million in aid to cover a period of four months. That was the time-frame within which the mission had operated. Only some \$225 million had been received, which included \$35 million contributed by the European Community for the United Nations guards. With regard to control and monitoring, as far as procurement was concerned, the

acquisition of goods and payment for goods could be monitored from either end. An approved list of goods might be drawn up that the Iraqi Government could acquire from any source on the four following conditions. Firstly, a copy of the purchase order should be sent to the Committee. Secondly, payment should be made by letter of credit, and the bank concerned should send a copy of the letter of credit to the Committee. Thirdly, the bank should include in the letter of credit a clause stating the condition that on inspection the goods must correspond exactly to the purchase order. A reputable inspection agent could be hired for the purpose.]

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SPKR[Agha Khan] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

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TXT[Fourthly, the United Nations must be equipped to monitor the list of goods, the purchase order, the letter of credit, the inspection certificate and so on. The result would be a transparent process, and if discrepancies arose at any stage payment could be blocked. Countries of origin should monitor financial transactions and double-check that the goods and materials being procured matched the list. Moreover, resolutions 665 (1990) and 670 (1990) on the trade embargo could still be enforced. The process could be verified by all parties concerned and procurement could be effectively carried through without the need for any new bureaucracy. The competent Iraqi authorities must assume due responsibility in terms of importing and distributing humanitarian shipments, given that the United Nations could not undertake distribution on a large enough scale to feed 18 million people.]

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SPKR[Agha Khan] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[The normal monitoring system in place in all countries in receipt of assistance from specialized agencies might provide enough information to see whether shipments were indeed reaching vulnerable groups, a process in which the specialized agencies and his coordinator in Iraq could play a part. It would then be possible to submit regular reports to enable the Committee to take rapid action where appropriate.]

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SPKR[Hannay] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[The comments made by the Executive Delegate were more relevant to financial transactions involving frozen assets than to sales of oil, which it would be harder to control.]

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CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Gharekhan] MS[India] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[The Executive Delegate's testimony had confirmed the need for action and had left the initiative with the Committee, whose responsibility it now was, in conjunction with the Security Council, to devise a monitoring system that would ensure that help

went where it was needed. Certainly the international community, and specifically the Western democracies as the major donor countries, should not be expected to provide money when money was already available. The central issues were those of distribution and verification. It would be helpful if the Chairman undertook urgent consultations to address those concerns. On the issue of the figures cited in respect of the grain harvest, he asked whether the bulk of the harvest was concentrated in Kurdish areas. With regard to distribution, it would be a waste to attempt to duplicate the Iraqi Government's own distribution machinery, which should, in fact, be used.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Gharekhan] MS[India] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[It would thus be important to ensure that there were no abuses to the detriment of vulnerable groups, to which end the United Nations system could monitor the distribution of foodstuffs. The Committee should appreciate that no system of safeguards would be foolproof, and accept that it would be satisfactory if a minimum of 90 per cent of shipments reached the intended recipients. Of the Iraqi assets frozen in Western countries, only those owned by the Iraqi Government should be used for the purchase of foodstuffs and essential civilian supplies. It was not at all clear to his delegation that any United Nations agency was in a position to assume responsibility for such action. Consultations were required. Any supplies purchased should, of course, be bought on the world market on a competitive basis.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Procedure]

SPKR[Hohenfellner] MS[Austria] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[It was his intention to hold immediate consultations on the matters raised by members of the Committee.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Agha Khan] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[The northern areas of Iraq, where the Kurdish population was concentrated, were the bread basket of the country. That complicated the situation because of the destruction of infrastructure and farm equipment in those areas. The conscription of Kurdish farmers into the armed forces had meant that the normal planting cycle had not been observed. Further, the prohibition on flights north of 36 degrees north had made it difficult to conduct aerial spraying of crops, although some spraying had been carried out with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. In addition, as already indicated, much of the food that was being grown was being exported to Turkey and Iran, where farmers were obtaining higher prices. With regard to distribution, it was paradoxical that many returning Kurdish refugees had been reluctant to have their names officially recorded on the ration rolls since that would enable them to be tracked by the authorities.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Agha Khan] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[That reality clearly complicated the task of avoiding discrimination against minorities in distributing supplies. With regard to the use of Iraqi assets in foreign banks, it was difficult to see how the United Nations, given its resources, could become involved in what would be a new kind of activity.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Moberly] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[Speaking as an expert participant in the mission, said that it would be possible to establish a means of monitoring oil sales to ensure that the proceeds were used for purchases authorized by the Committee. For example, in order to expedite matters, Iraqi State organizations could make purchases, with the price being verified by an independent agent and sent to the United Nations for monitoring purposes and approval. Movements of oil could take place through a limited number of terminals, subject to inspection by an agent, who could then accept the bill of lading on behalf of the United Nations and attest to the details of the transaction, informing the United Nations of any irregularity.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Moberly] MS[SG] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[Special accounts could be established with appropriate financial institutions in respect of which the Committee would have certain rights in order to facilitate its monitoring activities. Non-negotiable letters of credit could be prepared for the purposes of such transactions, and invoices could be sent to the United Nations to facilitate reconciliation. In any event it should be quite possible for the Committee to devise an appropriate monitoring system.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[45] DATE[7/22/91] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Brun] MS[UNICEF] FCT[Secretariat] LANG[1]

ITEM[S/22799]

TXT[Little time was available to avoid a tragedy in Iraq, where conditions were such that mass starvation was certain to occur before the end of 1991 unless action was taken to increase the supply of foodstuffs.]