

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Adoption of the Agenda]
TXT[ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA
LLOYD'S REGISTER'S ONSHORE OPERATION IN PORT AQABA IN CONNECTION
WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661 (1990)
COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE "NO-OBJECTION" PROCEDURE
NEW MATTERS
(a)FACSIMILE DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME OFFICE IN THE SUDAN
(b)LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM JAMAICA
(c)LETTER DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM SAUDI ARABIA
(d)LETTER DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM JORDAN
(e)LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(f)LETTER DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM ITALY
(g)LETTER DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE SUDAN
(h)LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM IRAQ
(i)LETTER DATED 30 AUGUST 1994 FROM IRAQ]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Adoption of the Agenda]
TXT[(j)NOTES VERBALES DATED 29 AUGUST, 9, 16 AND 26 SEPTEMBER
1994 FROM JORDAN
(k)LETTER DATED 29 AUGUST 1994 FROM JORDAN
MATTERS CARRIED OVER FROM PREVIOUS MEETINGS
(b)LETTER DATED 13 MAY 1994 FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
COMMISSION
(a)LETTER DATED 22 AUGUST 1994 FROM INDIA
The agenda was adopted.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in
connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution
661 (1990)]
TXT[As agreed in informal consultations, provision had been made
at the meeting for a briefing by representatives of Lloyd's
Register regarding the monitoring operation which it was
conducting at the request of the Government of Jordan, and
invited Messrs. Sanders and Whitehead from Lloyd's to take their
places at the table.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Sanders] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]
ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in
connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution
661 (1990)]
TXT[Lloyd's Register was a non-profit, technical organization; it
was independent of all Governments and other bodies and had no
connection with the insurance market. In accordance with its
constitution, its aim was to help enhance the safety of life and
property both at sea and on land. It had been in operation for
230 years and over that period its purpose had not changed in

terms of its independence, quality and integrity. Lloyd's Register was a world-wide organization with offices in virtually every country in the world; it had 255 offices and 1,800 technical personnel, and worked on behalf of 125 different Governments. Its corporate organization consisted of three operating divisions; the largest was the Marine Operations Division which accounted for 60 to 65 percent of operations.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Sanders] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[The operation in Aqaba was being run by the Industrial Division. That division, of which he was the Director and Mr. Whitehead was the head, provided technical inspection, certification and advisory services for industry on a world-wide basis.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[The onshore inspection activity in Aqaba was similar to other operations of Lloyd's Register, although a slightly different approach had been required. An initial study had been made in January 1994; he had visited the main port area, and Mr. Sanders had visited the Jordanian Government, at its invitation and with the support of a number of other groups including the United Nations. The logistics in Aqaba were very simple. The port area in the north of the Red Sea area was very well enclosed, and just below it there were a number of old oil terminals which were used as berths for cement and rice; below them was a small ferry operation to Egypt and then the main container terminal, which was the main focus of the inspection activity. To the south, towards the Saudi Arabian border, there were small berths and a large fertilizer berth.]

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SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[The whole area was accessible along one road and all of it was visible from the Aqaba end. In the main port there were nine main berths; seven were quite large, and two of them were used for grain; there were also two berths for smaller ships. Within the port area there was a free zone. The port itself was fully enclosed and was gated and secure. The port controls were an important factor. It was very difficult to move from gate to gate without having the proper passes; extensive documentation was required within the port area, and there were a number of committees that conducted examinations of cargoes of ships as they berthed.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[He and Mr. Sanders had produced a joint report which had been communicated to the United States State Department, the United Nations and the United Kingdom Foreign Office. A visit had also been made to the international maritime force (IMF) in Bahrain, which used a number of warships in the Red Sea area to stop ships entering the port of Aqaba in order to check that they had only Aqaba-bound cargo on board. Container ships were required to have a limited number of containers, for safety reasons: containers could be stacked only three-high and there also had to be enough space between containers to ensure access to the doors. The navies inspecting ships offshore had a number of reasons for putting ships on "divert", including incomplete manifests and inaccessible or prohibited cargo.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[Over the period from January 1993 onwards, the main cause of "divert" had been incomplete manifests, and shipping organizations were experiencing considerable problems in that respect. Between August 1990 to May 1994, there had been about 20,000 interceptions, 9,000 boardings and 2,000 visual inspections by aircraft overflying vessels with their hatches open; of that total, there had been 481 "diverts". The number of real problems in the cargoes examined had been very limited. He and Mr. Sanders had drawn a number of conclusions and submitted them to the parties concerned.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[They felt that by addressing the issue of manifests and moving the inspections from offshore to onshore it would be possible to increase the scope of inspections and gain much better access, and also to ensure better continuity: if the staff were fully briefed and conducted the inspection work in a fully controlled environment, there were real advantages for the Jordanian authorities and for shippers and shipowners, who would be able to use the port more effectively and efficiently; there would also be advantages for the navies conducting the inspections.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[There had been some difficulties for several months in reaching contractual arrangements between Jordan, the United Nations and Lloyd's Register; extensive discussion and exchange of information had been required in order to reach a consensus. Eventually, firm agreement had been reached between all sides, and the programme had been set in motion with a staff of eight; two people had first been sent out to study the area and determine the logistics, and six more people had started work at Aqaba on 25 August 1994. A number of test inspections had been conducted during the two-week period prior to that date, and full operations had been begun on 25 August with the cooperation of IMF.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[The facilities available to the Lloyd's Register staff were an office unit within the port area and, as promised by the port authorities, one office within the port itself and a further office in the container terminal. With the communications that had been set up, it was now possible to select the types of items to be inspected in advance of a ship's arrival, using the original manifest; if there were any discrepancies they could be resolved before the ship arrived, and the manifest could be taken on board and signed by the ship's master if there were any changes. In that way it was possible to avoid most of the "divert" activity that had been taking place.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[The Lloyd's Register staff were working in parallel with the customs authorities, which had deployed a full team of approximately the same size with a very comprehensive system of conducting examinations; all the Lloyd's Register staff had done was to redirect the customs activity to the items they wished to inspect, and inspect those items alongside the customs authorities to overcome any problems in terms of how the inspection was carried out. The Lloyd's Register staff had been given full authority to move wherever they wished and see whatever they wished at any time. They operated seven days a week, 24 hours a day, and were producing a number of reports on a weekly and monthly basis summarizing their activity.]

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SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution

661 (1990)]

TXT[Prior to the start of operations, the level of shipping in the area had been reduced, because shippers were waiting for the system to start. During the first four weeks of operation there had been roughly the same number of ships that had been reported by the port for the same period of the previous year. A total of 97 ships had been seen at discharge; the main advantage of onshore inspection was that it was possible to see ships as they were unloaded; bulk cargo ships could be inspected at the start of and during discharge, and the open hatches could be inspected after discharge. The Lloyd's Register staff were also inspecting ships to ensure that the types of equipment and materials they carried corresponded to the manifests. They had conducted 32 such inspections, and had inspected 248 containers.]

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SPKR[Whitehead] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[Samples were taken by the customs authorities and the Lloyd's Register staff could ask for additional samples if necessary. To date, they had been given all the cooperation which had been promised and were operating with the full authority they had expected. An update would be provided after a few months. They were asking that the Jordanian authorities consider sending reports directly to the United Nations. They were in regular contact with IMF to assure them of how operations were proceeding.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Aron] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[Her delegation was glad to hear that the level of cooperation with the Jordanian authorities was good. She asked what the reactions of shipowners and crews had been to the inspections and whether there had been any difficulty in transferring from offshore to onshore inspections.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Sanders] MS[Lloyds] FCT[Invitee] LANG[1]

ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution 661 (1990)]

TXT[So far shippers had been very receptive. The new system was advantageous to them because they were able to load their vessels more efficiently and transport a larger number of containers, so they were bringing in a larger number of ships. The local agents had been given a full briefing by the Lloyd's Register staff about the monitoring operation and the authorization for it.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Al-Battashi] MS[Oman] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in
connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution
661 (1990)]

TXT[The question of inspections was of vital importance for Oman.
His delegation would welcome a synopsis of the briefing in the
form of a report which could be sent on to capitals. Visits and
exchanges with members of Lloyd's Register would provide an
opportunity to gain more information about the system. He asked
whether it would also be possible to have periodic reports from
the Jordanian Government.]

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SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Lloyd's Register's onshore operation in Port Aqaba in
connection with the implementation of Security Council resolution
661 (1990)]

TXT[Would be willing to pursue with the representative of Jordan
the possibility of obtaining reports from the Government of
Jordan; he would also see whether further reports could be
obtained from Lloyd's Register. Another possibility would be to
explore ways in which the Secretariat could obtain the
information.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Communications under the no-objection procedure]
TXT[Her Government had adopted a new policy on agricultural spare
parts, and hoped that the Committee would consider adopting it
too. In the past it had requested the exporting country to
provide a detailed list of spare parts, which in some cases had
not been provided, leading her delegation to place such requests
on hold. Her delegation felt that all members of the Committee
should receive such information and should have an opportunity to
review manifests and that the Lloyd's Register inspectors should
also have a copy of lists of spare parts so as to be able to
check them against the actual cargo; the only way to do that was
to attach a spare parts list to a copy of the approval letter. In
future, her delegation would approve requests for agricultural
spare parts only if there was a comprehensive list of individual
spare parts attached to the original request. She proposed that
the Committee should issue a press release asking that all future
requests contain that information.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Communications under the no-objection procedure]
TXT[Her delegation wished to change its hold to a block on
communications S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4016 (cigarette plates),
S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4114 (wooden bead cushions),
S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4115 (globes) and S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4118
(mixers), place a block on communications S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4133
(leather jackets) and S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4170 (manicure sets),
release its hold on communication S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4409 (spare
parts for hospital kitchen equipment), release its block on

communication S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4434 (paper rolls for cigarettes), release its hold on communication S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4465 (spare parts for harvesters), release its block on communication S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4540 (glue), and release its hold on communication S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4594 (combine harvesters and spare parts), S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4874 (spare parts for tractor) and S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4875 (spare parts for tractors).]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Aron] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Communications under the no-objection procedure]
TXT[Her delegation wished to release its block on communications S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4037 (key holders), S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4068 (wrist watches), S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4091 (table lighters), S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4128 (ladies' gloves) and S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4130 (ladies' wallets) and change its block to a hold on communications S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4338 (kitchen equipment) and S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4423 (batteries for tractors, harvesters and cars).]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Communications under the no-objection procedure]
TXT[With regard to the United States' proposal, the Secretariat could be asked to prepare a short note to all missions reminding them of the importance, when submitting applications for lists of equipment, of specifying in precise detail the parts in question. That would apply to all types of equipment.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Al-Battashi] MS[Oman] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Communications under the no-objection procedure]
TXT[That procedure would be more expeditious than the issue of a press release.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Communications under the no-objection procedure]
TXT[If that was agreeable, the Committee would proceed along those lines.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]
TXT[Her Government was deeply concerned that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representative in Khartoum, in violation of authorized procedures, had allowed four Iraqi officials to travel on humanitarian meat flights on 4 July 1994 and that the incident had not been reported to the Committee until two months later. The incident would have very negative

repercussions, and her Government had raised the matter at the highest levels with the Sudanese representatives in Washington. Her delegation would have to block any future requests for meat flights from the Sudan to Iraq. It believed that the Governments of the Sudan and Iraq had been fully aware of the humanitarian nature of the flights and had chosen to abuse the privilege; her delegation was not willing to risk allowing any future flights.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Al-Battashi] MS[Oman] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]

TXT[His delegation agreed that abuses occurring on board aircraft carrying humanitarian shipments should be dealt with; indeed, they should not have been allowed in the first place. However, the humanitarian nature of shipments such as meat and other foodstuffs had to be borne in mind. His delegation did not feel that one incident should be the basis for denying permission for all such flights in the future. The Committee, like other Security Council Committees, had to respect the established principles for humanitarian shipments.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Egunsola] MS[Nigeria] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]

TXT[It was the duty of the Committee to monitor the exemptions granted under the relevant resolutions. The Committee should ensure that breaches did not occur in future rather than regarding the incident as a reason for stopping all humanitarian flights. He suggested that a letter should be sent to the representatives of Iraq and the Sudan informing them of the Committee's concern about the incident. The UNDP representative was also partly to blame because he had granted permission for the Iraqi officials to travel on the flights.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Badri] MS[Djibouti] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]

TXT[Supported the proposal made by the representative of Nigeria.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Al-Battashi] MS[Oman] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]

TXT[Supported the proposal made by the representative of Nigeria.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Raza] MS[Pakistan] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan
(S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]
TXT[Supported the proposal made by the representative of
Nigeria.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan
(S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]
TXT[Observed that it would be useful to write to Iraq and the
Sudan, but that the United States was not at the moment able to
reconsider its position. Despite the strong controls in place,
including even a United Nations monitor, the Iraqis had found a
way to breach them.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Al-Battashi] MS[Oman] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan
(S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]
TXT[Asked the United States delegation not to give its last word
on the matter until the Committee had received a response, which
could then be referred to the United States authorities for a
final decision.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan
(S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]
TXT[Agreed to do so. The United States was of course supportive
of all humanitarian shipments, but felt that they could go by
land. The issue was a pattern of abuse by Iraq of air
shipments.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Raza] MS[Pakistan] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan
(S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]
TXT[Asked whether the letters from the Committee would simply
express concern or state that further flights would not be
authorized.]

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SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Fax dated 8 September 1994 from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) office in the Sudan

(S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4758)]

TXT[Nigeria had simply proposed communicating an expression of concern; in the absence of Committee consent, however, there would be no letters authorizing further flights. In any case, the vast majority of meat shipments did reach Iraq over land. Perhaps Iraq and the Sudan could provide new information that might change the United States position, and he would therefore write to both delegations. The Nigerian proposal and the United States response had both been constructive.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 7 September 1994 from Jamaica (re: accumulation of interest on Iraqi loan) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4761)]
TXT[Debtor countries could make repayments into a blocked account, and the interest on the loans would continue to accrue until full repayment in the normal way; however, Iraq should have no access to that interest until the sanctions had been lifted.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 7 September 1994 from Jamaica (re: accumulation of interest on Iraqi loan) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4761)]
TXT[The proposal of the representative of the United States not having drawn any objection, it was so decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Silva] MS[France] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 13 September 1994 from Saudi Arabia (re: partial release of funds for the Arab Industrial Investment Company) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4978)]
TXT[It would be difficult to approve the request for funds to enable the Arab Industrial Investment Company to hold meetings until the Committee was assured that the release of those funds would not entail the concomitant release of Iraqi and Libyan funds, those two States being Company stockholders. His delegation believed that the transfer of the Company's headquarters to Tunis must be the precondition for any utilization of its assets.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 13 September 1994 from Saudi Arabia (re: partial release of funds for the Arab Industrial Investment Company) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4978)]
TXT[The proposal of the representative of France not having drawn any objection, it was so decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Aron] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 9 September 1994 from Jordan (re: request for flight permission to Baghdad) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4791)]
TXT[Her delegation firmly objected to agreeing to the request

because of the frequency of the flights proposed, which was tantamount to establishing a full airline schedule, and because of the wide range of purposes for which the flights were being requested, some only marginally humanitarian. The United Kingdom would, however, consider approving an individual request for a flight to transport pilgrims.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 9 September 1994 from Jordan (re: request for flight permission to Baghdad) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4791)]
TXT[Agreed that Baghdad airport must remain closed except in an emergency.]

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CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Silva] MS[France] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 9 September 1994 from Jordan (re: request for flight permission to Baghdad) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4791)]
TXT[Under Security Council resolution 670(1990), it was not possible to grant a general request for authorization of flights.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Badri] MS[Djibouti] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 9 September 1994 from Jordan (re: request for flight permission to Baghdad) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4791)]
TXT[Suggested that the Chairman should inform Jordan of the willingness of the United Kingdom to consider examining an individual request.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Raza] MS[Pakistan] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 9 September 1994 from Jordan (re: request for flight permission to Baghdad) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4791)]
TXT[The Chairman should rather enunciate the general principle that the Committee was willing to look into strictly humanitarian flights in exceptional circumstances, rather than specifying numbers of flights.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Aron] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 9 September 1994 from Jordan (re: request for flight permission to Baghdad) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4791)]
TXT[Suggested that the term "case by case" was perhaps the key.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 9 September 1994 from Jordan (re: request for flight permission to Baghdad) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4791)]
TXT[Would circulate a draft letter on the matter for comment by interested members.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]
TXT[The United States had no objection to the shipment of
medicines or the visit of parliamentarians, but believed that the
Baghdad airport should remain closed. It could therefore not
approve the flight requests. The same purposes could be achieved
by overland shipment or travel.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Gatillov] MS[Russia] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]
TXT[Noted that there was a precedent for the authorization of
shipments of medicine by air.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]
TXT[The United States would consider the request for shipment of
medicines by air if it was established that there was an urgent
humanitarian need.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Gatillov] MS[Russia] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]
TXT[Observing that shipments of medicine were necessarily
humanitarian, asked the Chairman to issue a letter of a general
nature stating that the Committee was not opposed in principle to
such shipments.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]
TXT[Would like to have the United States view represented in such
a letter. Nothing in the Russian request indicated the special
urgency of the shipment in question, and her delegation saw no
reason for it.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]
TXT[Pointed out that shipments of medicine to Iraq were subject
not to approval, but only to notification. Air transport had been
authorized in the past in urgent situations. His letter would
have to set out what was permissible under Security Council
resolutions regarding shipments by air, which could be considered

under specific conditions.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Aron] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]

TXT[Suggested that the Chairman's letter should perhaps not refer
specifically to the request at issue, but should simply state the
Committee's policy so that the recipients could refer to it in
future requests.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]

SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 20 September 1994 from the Russian Federation
(re: charter flight requests) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4888)]

TXT[Would circulate a draft letter for comment by interested
members.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Silva] MS[France] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 1 September 1994 from Italy (re: questions
concerning the financing of exports to
Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4670)]

TXT[Observed that the second issue raised in the Italian letter
the authorization of an operation similar to barter; such
operations were forbidden by the Security Council resolutions. As
to the important general issue of the use of the sub-account of
the escrow account, Italy should be informed that in principle
funds could be used by States to finance humanitarian shipments
in accordance with Security Council resolution 778 (1992),
provided that the proceeds of the transaction passed through the
escrow account.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Aron] MS[United Kingdom] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 1 September 1994 from Italy (re: questions
concerning the financing of exports to
Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4670)]

TXT[Agreed that any barter operation was unacceptable, and that a
general explanation should be given of how the sub-account of the
escrow account was meant to be used, even though it had never
been. The United Kingdom itself was interested in making use of
it, despite the very complicated procedures and preconditions
involved, and hoped that would become possible.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 1 September 1994 from Italy (re: questions
concerning the financing of exports to
Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4670)]

TXT[Recalled that the Secretariat had already developed a
formulation on the matter, and observed that the sub-account of
the escrow account had remained inoperative because Iraq had not

fully complied with the Security Council resolutions.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Silva] MS[France] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 1 September 1994 from Italy (re: questions concerning the financing of exports to

Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4670)]

TXT[Suggested that the Secretariat document in question should be resubmitted to the Committee for review before it was passed on to Italy. It was so decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Silva] MS[France] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 23 September 1994 from the Sudan (re: flights to carry Kenyans and Tanzanians to Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.5106)]

TXT[Proposed that before addressing the substance of the request, the Committee should ask the Chairman to seek the views of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania as to how the operation would be carried out.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Aron] MS[France] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 23 September 1994 from the Sudan (re: flights to carry Kenyans and Tanzanians to Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.5106)]

TXT[Supported the proposal of Mr. Silva of France.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]

SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 23 September 1994 from the Sudan (re: flights to carry Kenyans and Tanzanians to Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.5106)]

TXT[Agreed that their response would be helpful, and suggested that he should contact both delegations. It was so decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]

SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 19 September 1994 from Iraq (re: impact of sanctions on health of Iraqis) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.5091)]

TXT[Took it that the Committee wished to take note of the communication. It was so decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]

SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 19 September from Iraq (re: impact of sanctions on health of Iraqis) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.5102)]

TXT[Took it that the Committee wished to take note of the communication. It was so decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]

SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]

ITEM[Notes verbales dated 29 August, 9, 16 and 26 September 1994 from Jordan (re: reports on food and medical supplies through

Jordan) ((S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4686, 4893, 4892 and 4902)]
TXT[Took it that, in accordance with the usual practice, the
Committee wished to take note of the communications. It was so
decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 29 August 1994 from Jordan (re: Jordan's oil
importation from Iraq) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4658)]
TXT[Took it that, in accordance with the usual practice, the
Committee wished to take note of the communications. It was so
decided.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]
SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 13 May 1994 from the United Nations Special
Commission (UNSCOM) (re: import/export mechanism for Iraq in
accordance with paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 715
(1991) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.3065)]
TXT[Had consulted with UNSCOM regarding the preparation of the
lists to be annexed to any decision relating to the dual-use
goods covered by the import/export mechanism, and had been
advised that the technical seminars organized for the purpose
would be held in a week or so and that UNSCOM expected to submit
its final proposals to the Committee in two to three weeks.
Also, he had engaged in ongoing consultations with members of the
Committee and with UNSCOM on various technical questions, and was
pleased to report that they had largely been resolved, so that
the Committee could proceed to consider the substantive questions
at its next meeting.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Jones] MS[United States] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 22 August 1994 from India (re: request for
chartered pilgrimage flights) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4609)]
TXT[Her delegation had met bilaterally with the Indian delegation
and was convinced of the legitimacy of the flights and of India's
full support of the Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless,
the United States could not approve the request because its
concern was with Iraq's intentions, and no level of guarantees
would be sufficient to overcome the problems. It was also
concerned for the security of civilian passengers in flights
passing through the no-fly zone. It therefore believed that the
Baghdad airport must remain closed. The United States was
sensitive to the humanitarian nature of the request and hoped
that the pilgrims could reach Iraq over land.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]
CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]
SPKR[Raza] MS[Pakistan] FCT[Member] LANG[1]
ITEM[Letter dated 22 August 1994 from India (re: request for
chartered pilgrimage flights) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4609)]
TXT[Believed that in principle the Committee should find a way to
authorize the pilgrimage flights, while not allowing Iraq to
subvert their purpose. The second point raised by the United

States delegation - the impossibility of guaranteeing the safety of such flights- was merely a peripheral matter.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Intervention]

SPKR[Al-Battashi] MS[Oman] FCT[Member] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 22 August 1994 from India (re: request for chartered pilgrimage flights) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4609)]

TXT[Pointed out the time constraints involved and the humanitarian and religious reasons for allowing the flights to proceed. His delegation did not accept that the flights must be denied, and proposed that the matter should be reconsidered at the next meeting.]

ISSUE[IRAQ/KUWAIT]

CAT[661] MTG[116] DATE[10/11/94] TYPE[Procedure]

SPKR[Keating] MS[New Zealand] FCT[Chairman] LANG[1]

ITEM[Letter dated 22 August 1994 from India (re: request for chartered pilgrimage flights) (S/AC.25/1994/COMM.4609)]

TXT[The suggestion of the representative of Oman not having drawn any objection, it was so decided.]